

## Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO OAU COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 007726

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO MOSCOW, THE HAGUE,  
LONDON, GENEVA, PEKING, NATO, EC BRUSSELS, PARIS, STOCKHOLM,  
TEL AVIV FROM USUN NEW YORK JAN 11:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 0069

DEPT PASS ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNGA, XA

SUBJ: 31ST UNGA: AFRICAN ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE BY THE  
AFRICAN GROUP

REF: USUN 7000, OF 1975 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: WELL BEFORE IT BEGAN, THE 31ST UN GENERAL  
ASSEMBLY (UNGA) WAS TOUTED AS AN "AFRICAN SESSION". AS  
MATTERS DEVELOPED, AFRICA DID OCCUPY CENTER STAGE.  
INDEED, THE 31ST UNGA OFTEN WAS DISCUSSING ESSENTIALLY  
THE SAME AFRICAN ISSUES DAILY IN SEVERAL FORUMS: E.G.,  
WHAT WAS BEING DEBATED UNDER AN "ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES"  
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ITEM IN COMMITTEE III WAS BEING DEBATED UNDER HEADINGS  
OF "FOREIGN ECONOMIC INTERESTS" IN COMMITTEE IV AND  
"DECOLONIZATION" IN PLENARY. ABETTING THE AFRICANS  
WERE THE REST OF THE "NON-ALIGNED", THE SOVIETS AND THEIR  
ALLIES, AND THE CHINESE. ISSUES RELATED TO RHODESIA,  
NAMIBIA, AND APARTHEID WERE PRESSED WITH CONSIDERABLE  
SUCCESS. ANGOLA WAS ADMITTED TO THE UN. ATTENTION  
GIVEN AFRICAN ISSUES WAS HEIGHTENED IN LARGE PART  
BECAUSE OF OUR EFFORTS BEFOREHAND, WHICH WERE SUCCESSFUL  
IN DEFUSING COMPLETELY OR TO AN IMPORTANT DEGREE QUESTIONS

SUCH AS KOREA, PUERTO RICO, AS WELL AS TO A CERTAIN DEGREE THE PANAMA CANAL, EXPULSION OR SUSPENSION OF ISRAEL AND "ZIONISM EQUALS RACISM". WHILE THE AFRICAN GROUP WAS RELATIVELY PATIENT AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL TOWARD THE WEST, THE GROUP NOW IS AWAITING CONCRETE RESULTS FROM NEGOTIATIONS ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA, AS WELL AS MEASURES TO HASTEN THE ABOLITION OF APARTHEID. THE AFRICANS CLEARLY EXPECT MUCH FROM THE UNITED STATES IN THESE AREAS. END SUMMARY.

2. SOUTHERN AFRICA: ON THE ISSUES WHICH CONCERNED THEM MOST, THE AFRICANS ENJOYED TANGIBLE SUCCESS:

(A) ANGOLA: ANGOLA WAS ADMITTED TO UN MEMBERSHIP IN DECEMBER. (SEYCHELLES JOINED IN SEPTEMBER.)

(B) NAMIBIA: THE AFRICANS WERE ABLE TO EXCLUDE FROM DEBATE ALL SPOKESMEN OTHER THAN SWAPO AND TO ATTAIN UN OBSERVER STATUS FOR SWAPO. WHAT SWAPO COULD NOT GAIN ON THE BATTLEFIELD OR AT THE BALLOT BOX, IT WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN IN NEW YORK.

(C) APARTHEID: THE AFRICANS WERE ABLE TO MOVE THE APARTHEID DEBATE INTO PLENARY FOR THE FIRST TIME. SPOKESMEN OF SOUTH AFRICAN "LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" WERE THUS ENABLED TO SPEAK IN PLENARY. ALSO FOR THE FIRST TIME, USE OF "ARMED FORCE" WAS ENDORSED IN A UNGA RESOLUTION. THE AFRICANS ADVANCED THEIR CAMPAIGN TO DENY THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PRETORIA GOVERNMENT AND TO BRING  
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APARTHEID INTO THE DECOLONIZATION CONTEXT. SOWETO AND OTHER KILLINGS, LACK OF REAL PROGRESS ON NAMIBIA, DIFFICULTIES IN RHODESIA, AND THE IMPRESSION THAT VORSTER HAD NOT CHANGED HIS MIND ON APARTHEID (REINFORCED BY AN INTERVIEW WITH HIM PUBLISHED IN THE OCTOBER 19 NEW YORK TIMES) COMBINED TO ENCOURAGE HEAVY ATTACKS ON SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE UNGA.

(D) RHODESIA: THE AFRICANS PERCEIVED THEMSELVES AS PATIENT AND BUSINESSLIKE, "KEEPING UP THE PRESSURE" ON THE GROUND AND AT THE UN AS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED.

3. OTHER "DECOLONIZATION" ISSUES: HERE, WE ALSO SAW LESS THAN USUAL ACRIMONY, AGAIN DUE IN LARGE PART TO NON-UN RELATED DEVELOPMENTS.

(A) SAHARA: THE ALGERIANS, BLOODIED BY FAILURES AT PORT LOUIS AND COLOMBO OVER THE SAHARA, ACCEPTED A CONSENSUS AGREEMENT IN COMMITTEE IV FAVORABLE TO MOROCCO/MAURITANIA.

(B) TIMOR: ALTHOUGH SOME AFRICAN RADICALS (E.G., BENIN) PERSISTED IN VIGOROUSLY DENOUNCING INDONESIA'S INCORPORATION OF EAST TIMOR, MOST AFRICANS APPEARED INCLINED IN SPIRIT IF NOT BY VOTE TO ACCEPT THIS INCORPORATION BY "NONALIGNED"INDONESIA AS A FAIT ACCOMPLI.

(C) FRENCH ISSUES: FRANCE WAS HIT RELATIVELY LIGHTLY ON DJIBOUTI, BUT HARD ON MAYOTTE.

4. AFRICAN LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION: AFRICAN SUCCESSES WERE ACHIEVED DESPITE LACK OF GOOD LEADERSHIP AND GROUP COORDINATION. ALGERIA, STUNG ON SAHARA BEFOREHAND AND PREOCCUPIED WITH DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS, APPEARED TO OPT OUT OF A LEADERSHIP ROLE. SENEGAL'S PERM REP FALL WAS COMPARATIVELY MUTE. SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF AFRICAN LEADERSHIP, TANZANIA'S PERM REP SALIM AND ZAMBIA'S PERM REP KAMANA WERE BOTH IN GENEVA DURING MUCH OF THE UNGA FOR THE RHODESIAN TALKS. MONTHLY AFRICAN  
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GROUP CHAIRMEN CONTRIBUTED LITTLE; OAU OBSERVER OFFICE HEAD OUATTARA, EVEN LESS. MAURITIUS'S PERM REP RAMPHUL, SPEAKING ALSO ON BEHALF OF THE OAU PRESIDENCY, PERFORMED HIS ACCUSTOMED BUFFOONERY. HE EVEN ALIENATED HIS COLLEAGUES BY INSISTING ALONG WITH OCTOBER AFRICAN GROUP CHAIRMAN PERM REP KANTE OF MALI THAT A RECORDED VOTE BE TAKEN IN PLENARY ON THE TRANSKEI RESOLUTION. WHILE RAMPHUL AND KANTE SAW THIS AS A MOVE TO ISOLATE THE US, IT SERVED AT THE SAME TIME TO SHOW TO SOUTH AFRICA A LACK OF UNANIMITY AND TO OTHERS AN ABSENCE OF AFRICAN COORDINATION. NIGERIA'S PERM REP HARRIMAN, TOGETHER WITH UN COMMISSIONER FOR NAMIBIA MACBRIDE, AND OTHERS, AUTHORED A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF UNPALATABLE RESOLUTIONS ON APARTHEID AND SOME UNSAVORY ANTI-US ALLEGATIONS WHICH CLOUDED THE NAMIBIA DEBATE. ADDITIONALLY, HARRIMAN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN BEHIND THE "ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES" RESOLUTIONS IN COMMITTEE III. BUT HE WAS HARDLY A GROUP LEADER. ANOTHER NIGERIAN, AMBASSADOR CLAR FROM NIGERIA'S MISSION IN GENEVA, PLAYED A PROMINENT LEADERSHIP ROLE AMONG AFRICANS IN COMMITTEE I DISARMAMENT DEBATES. IN GENERAL, HE TENDED TO BE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF THE US AND USSR. IN SUMMARY, VARIOUS, CHANGING AFRICAN LEADERS, FLOOR MANAGERS, OR WORKING GROUPS, RATHER THAN SPECIFIC PERSONALITIES, ROSE TO THE OCCASION ON INDIVIDUAL CASES.

5. AFRICAN RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHERS:

(A) UNITED STATES: THE DELEGATIONS OF THE IVORY COAST, ZAIRE, AND UPPER VOLTA SOUGHT CLOSE COORDINATION WITH US. BEFORE VIRTUALLY EACH AND EVERY MAJOR ISSUE AROSE, AND PRIOR TO ANY INITIATIVE THEY UNDERTOOK, THOSE MISSIONS WERE IN TOUCH WITH US. THEY OFTEN WERE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TO COSPONSOR "FRIENDLY" DRAFT RESOLUTIONS. IN A BROAD FRAMEWORK, TIMELY ADVANCE LOBBYING WITH AFRICANS ON KOREA, THE PANAMA CANAL, PUERTO RICO, AND "ZIONISM/RACISM" PROVED FRUITFUL THIS YEAR. WE COULD WELL EXPAND THIS LIST OF US-RELATED ISSUES TO INCLUDE GUAM.  
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(B) THE USSR: "COMRADELY" AFRICAN NATIONS WERE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE SOVIETS. SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNIST LINE AMONG EX-PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES WAS EVIDENT.

(C) SWEDEN: SWEDEN WAS VIGOROUS IN SUPPORT OF THE AFRICANS. IT OFTEN VOTED FOUR-SQUARE WITH TANZANIA.

(D) THE "NONALIGNED": COLOMBO'S DOCUMENTS SUPPLIED LINES OF POLICY DIRECTION FOR THE AFRICANS.

(E) THE ARABS: THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CONCERTED AFRO-ARAB COOPERATION DURING THE UNGA. ON THE CONTRARY, IN COMMITTEE V, WHEN THE NEW SCALE OF ASSESSMENT WAS TAKEN UP, THERE WAS A SPLIT BETWEEN PROSPEROUS ARABS AND POOR AFRICANS.

5. AFRICAN PERCEPTION OF THE US: ISOLATED IN MUCH OF THE VOTING, THE US NEVERTHELESS WAS PERCEIVED BY AFRICANS AS HAVING PURSUED A POSITIVE ROLE ON THE RHODESIAN TALKS AND AS REPRESENTING THE KEY TO THE FUTURE OF BOTH NAMIBIA AND APARTHEID. THE WERE WILLING TO GIVE US (AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION) A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO MOVE FORWARD ON THESE ISSUES. IN FACT, CONSIDERING THE GENERAL AFRICAN PERCEPTION OF THE NEED TO KEEP OUR FEET TO THE FIRE, MOST ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA, WE MAY HAVE COME OUT AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WERE FEW REAL EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE AFRICANS AT SIGNIFICANT COMPROMISES WITH THE WEST IN DRAFTING EXERCISES. THUS, THE US WAS ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY IN UNCOMPLIMENTARY TERMS IN A NUMBER OF RESOLUTIONS, AS WERE THE FRG, FRANCE, ISRAEL, AND THE UK. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIETS CONTINUED OPPORTUNISTICALLY TO DO THEIR BEST TO PORTRAY THE US AS AFRICA'S ENEMY, OFTEN INITIALLY EMPLOYING A SURROGATE SUCH AS BULGARIA, AND LATER LASHING OUT THEMSELVES. THE BRITISH EXAMPLE OF HITTING BACK AT THE SOVIET FOR CRITICISM BOTH OF BRITAIN AND OF NATO WAS EFFECTIVE, AND WE WOULD RECOMMEND IT BE STEPPED UP, AS REQUIRED, BY OTHER NATO

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MEMBERS. (SEE USUN 0014 (NOTAL) CONCERNING COOPERATION WITH OUR WESTERN ALLIES IN COMMITTEE IV.)

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE AFRICANS REALISTICALLY ADMIT THAT INTEMPERATE UNGA RESOLUTIONS OPPOSED BY COUNTRIES VITAL FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION ARE SO MANY BITS OF PAPER. AS ALREADY NOTED, THE AFRICANS REGARD OUR ROLE AS ESSENTIAL TO THE SOLUTION OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS. THROUGH HIS MAJOR EFFORTS, GOVERNOR SCRANTON GENERATED MUCH GOOD WILL FOR US WITH AFRICANS HERE, AND THEY NOW HOLD OUT GREAT HOPES THAT PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE-DESIGNATE ANDREW YOUNG WILL CONTINUE TO

PRESS FORWARD ON AFRICAN ISSUES. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON  
US TO PROMOTE PROGRESS ON RHODESIA, NAMIBIA, AND APARTHEID.  
IN THE MONTHS TO COME, WE CAN COUNT ON PRESSURES IN UN  
FORUMS ON MATTERS SUCH AS NEW INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH  
AFRICA AND THE QUESTION OF A CHAPTER VII DETERMINATION  
IN RELATION TO A MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO ON SOUTH AFRICA.  
WE WILL NEED TO RELATE DECISIONS REGARDING THESE MATTERS  
TO OUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE REST  
OF AFRICA. IN THIS CONNECTION, NIGERIA'S PERM REP  
HARRIMAN HAS STRESSED THAT ALL COUNTRIES HAVE THEIR  
INTERESTS AND THESE SHOULD BE RESPECTED; BUT THAT THE  
AFRICANS CANNOT ACCEPT A WESTERN POSITION WHICH, IN  
AFRICAN EYES, AMOUNTS TO DEFENSE OF A POLICY WHICH CAN  
ONLY ENCOURAGE THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN ITS OBDURACY.  
SCRANTON UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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## Message Attributes

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